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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Joseph McGuire appeals his conviction for aiding and 
abetting the use of an explosive to destroy property used in 
an activity affecting interstate commerce in violation of 18 
U.S.C. SS 2 and 844(i). For the reasons that follow we hold 
that the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish 
the jurisdictional element of the offense, and we will 
reverse. 
 
I. 
 
On the morning of December 19, 1995, Joseph's mother, 
Lee Ann McGuire, was injured when a pipe bomb exploded 
inside her Toyota Camry. Mrs. McGuire operated LD&B 
Catering with her best friend, Diane Murray. LD&B 
Catering, was licensed to do business in Pennsylvania, and 
operated locally. Mrs. McGuire and Ms. Murray had an 
arrangement with a local church whereby they would use 
the church's kitchen to prepare food for their catering jobs. 
They gave the church 30% of any profit they made in return 
for the use of the kitchen. Murray and McGuire used 
several different vehicles, including Lee Ann's Toyota, to 
transport items for their catering business. 
 
On the morning of December 19, 1995, that Toyota was 
destroyed by a pipe bomb which had been planted beneath 
the driver's seat. The explosion caused the catering 
business to stop operating for approximately three months. 
However, the interruption was not due to the loss of the 
Toyota, or anything in it. Rather, it resulted from Diane 
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Murray's need to help Lee Ann McGuire recover from 
injuries sustained when the bomb exploded. 
 
The crime remained unsolved for nearly a year. However, 
in November 1996, agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms questioned Joseph McGuire and his 
fiance, Kristen Markeeta. During that interrogation, 
McGuire purportedly confessed to helping a friend, Gary 
Mingle, place the bomb in McGuire's mother's car. 1 
McGuire stated that he and Ms. Markeeta solicited Mingle 
to "take care of" Mrs. McGuire because they resented Mrs. 
McGuire's interference in their relationship. McGuire's 
assistance consisted of signaling Mingle by turning on a 
light on Mrs. McGuire's porch. This signaled Mingle that 
the occupants of the McGuire household were asleep and 
that it was safe for Mingle to place the bomb in Mrs. 
McGuire's car. McGuire was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 
S 844(i), and this appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 844(i) states in relevant part: 
 
       Whoever maliciously damages . . ., by means of an 
       explosive, any . . . vehicle, or other real or personal 
       property used in . . . any activity affecting interstate or 
       foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for not more 
       than ten years or fined not more than $10,000, or 
       both; 
 
"Thus, an essential element of the crime of arson under 
S 844(i) is that the property was used in any activity 
affecting interstate or foreign commerce." United States v. 
Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 
United States v. Karlic, 997 F.2d 564, 571 (9th Cir. 1993)) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In this appeal, McGuire challenges the authenticity of his statement, 
and argues the district court violated the corpus delecti rule admitting 
it. 
However, we need not resolve those issues because of our determination 
that the government failed to establish the jurisdictional element of the 
crime. 
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(internal quotations omitted). This jurisdictional element, 
like all other elements of any criminal offense, must be 
established beyond a reasonable doubt. Pappadopoulos, 64 
F.3d at 524 (citing United States v. Nukida, 8 F.3d 665, 
669-73 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
 
Both parties here rely heavily on the Supreme Court's 
decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The 
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. S 844(i) is not implicated in 
this appeal. In Lopez 
 
       the Supreme Court invalidated the Gun Free School 
       Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal offense for 
       any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a 
       place that the individual knows, or has reasonable 
       cause to believe, is a school zone. The Court . . . 
       observed that [that Act] neither regulates a commercial 
       activity nor contains a requirement that the possession 
       be connected in any way to interstate commerce. 
 
United States v. Gaydos, 108 F.3d 505, 508 (3rd Cir. 1997) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In Gaydos 
we upheld the constitutionality of S 844(i) against a 
challenge bottomed on Lopez. We stated: 
 
       Unlike the statute at issue in Lopez, S 844(i) contains 
       a jurisdictional element which ensures, on a case-by- 
       case basis, that the property in question must be used 
       in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity 
       affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 
 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Here, McGuire makes a constitutional argument, but his 
primary challenge is to the sufficiency of the evidence that 
was introduced to establish the interstate commerce nexus 
required by S 844(i).2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We apply a particularly deferential standard of review when deciding 
a sufficiency of the evidence challenge. "It is not for us to weigh the 
evidence or to determine the credibility of the witnesses. . . . Rather, 
we 
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, 
and will sustain the verdict if `any rational trier of fact could have 
found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' " United 
States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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B. 
 
At trial, the prosecutor sought to establish the 
jurisdictional nexus required by this statute by relying 
upon Mrs. McGuire's occasional use of her Toyota in her 
catering activity, and the contents of the Toyota's trunk 
when it exploded. The evidence established that a bottle of 
Tropicana orange juice had been in the trunk of the Toyota 
when it exploded. The raw material for that orange juice 
was produced in Florida and then shipped by "tanker" 
truck to Reading Pennsylvania where it was packaged for 
home consumption and distributed. Lee Ann McGuire or 
Diane Murray purchased the orange juice at a Sam's Club 
in Altoona Pennsylvania for use in a catering job scheduled 
for December 20, 1995. Although the government conceded 
that the catering business itself was a small, intrastate 
activity, the prosecutor argued that the bottle of orange 
juice was sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce 
requirement of 18 U.S.C. S 844(i) because the Florida 
origins of the juice established that the activities of LD&B 
catering had an interstate effect, and the Toyota was 
therefore used in an activity affecting interstate commerce. 
 
On appeal the government suggests that we should now 
look past the orange juice and consider other items that 
were in the trunk, the fuel in the gas tank, and the nature 
of Mrs. McGuire's catering business. The government states 
"[a]t the time of the explosion, there were in the trunk of 
the Camry toothpicks, Tyson's chicken, and Tropicana 
orange juice for a catering job the next day." Appellee's Br. 
at 24. The prosecution also states that the catering 
business "was a licensed business that had some effect 
upon interstate commerce. The government is not required 
to show that this effect was itself substantial." Appellee's 
Br. at 24. However, the only evidence that the government 
introduced at trial of the effect the catering business had 
on interstate commerce pertained to the production, 
transportation, and distribution of the orange juice. During 
the trial, the court expressed its concern about the 
sufficiency of that proof: 
 
       [The Court]: it boils down to a very simple question 
       . . . why is this a federal case. .. Does this case,. . .as 
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       a federal case come down to nothing more than a 
       carton of orange juice? . . . 
 
       [The Prosecutor]: Absolutely not, Your Honor. I think 
       the question is whether LD&B Catering had an effect 
       on interstate commerce. . .. [w]hether this vehicle was 
       used in an activity, . . . affecting interstate commerce. 
 
       So it is our position that we have established from an 
       evidentiary standpoint that LD&B Catering, by virtue of 
       its existence as a for profit commercial enterprise, 
       supplied by food items purchased at distributors, to 
       include out of state suppliers, is by its nature a 
       commercial enterprise which affects interstate 
       commerce. 
 
*** 
 
       we have sought to demonstrate, . . . that the property 
       in question have (sic) a de minimis effect on interstate 
       commerce. 
 
App. 566-68. The trial judge then summarized the positions 
of the defendant and the prosecution. The court noted that 
the defendant was arguing that, under Lopez, the 
prosecution must show that the act he was accused of had 
a "substantial effect on interstate commerce" while the 
prosecution maintained that it need only satisfy a"de 
minimis test." Id at 568. The prosecutor accepted this 
statement of his position, and elaborated as follows: 
 
       I would concede the point. I am and have proceeded on 
       a de minimis platform. I have not presented evidence, 
       other evidence of the manner and breadth of which 
       LD&B Catering had an effect as a commercial 
       enterprise on interstate commerce, to include the fact 
       perhaps that the automobile was supplied by gasoline 
       which had moved in interstate commerce, or to show 
       that the building in which LD&B Catering operated, 
       that is the church, was supplied by heat and fuel or an 
       electrical grid which had moved in interstate commerce 
       . . . It is my position that the standard is that it have 
       a de minimis effect, and that I have met that burden. 
 
App. at 570. However, despite these theoretical assertions, 
the only evidence that was offered was summarized in the 
following proffer: 
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       I'm prepared to show, for instance, that Tropicana 
       orange juice, that being the single item which was 
       located in the trunk of the vehicle, had moved in 
       interstate commerce. 
 
App. at 571. 
 
The jury convicted the defendant as charged in the single 
count indictment. Following the conviction, the district 
court issued a Memorandum Order explaining its rejection 
of the defendant's previously filed motion for judgment of 
acquittal under Fed. R. Evid. 29(b). The district court ruled 
that the carton of orange juice was sufficient to satisfy 
jurisdiction as it established that the catering business was 
an activity that affected commerce. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 2 
("The government's theory is that while the Toyota was not 
itself used in interstate commerce, the Toyota was used in 
an activity affecting interstate commerce."). 3  
 
C. 
 
The government's assertion that the carton of orange 
juice is sufficient to support the jurisdictional element of 
S 844(i) relies in large part upon Russell v. United States, 
471 U.S. 858 (1985). There, the defendant was convicted of 
violating S 844(i) based upon the arson of a rental property 
which he owned, earned rental income from, and treated as 
business property for tax purposes. On appeal he argued 
that the building was not commercial or business property, 
and therefore the charged arson lacked the interstate 
commerce nexus required under 18 U.S.C. S 844(i). The 
Supreme Court rejected that argument and held that"[t]he 
reference to `any building . . . used . . . in any activity 
affecting interstate or foreign commerce' " in the statute 
" `expresses an intent by Congress to exercise its full power 
under the Commerce Clause.' " Russell, 471 U.S. at 859. 
The Court concluded that "the legislative history suggests 
that Congress at least intended to protect all business 
property, as well as some additional property that might 
not fit that description . . ." Id. at 86. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In the Memorandum Order, the court stated:"I have expressed to 
counsel for both parties my own view that the interstate commerce 
nexus is a thin one." Dist. Ct. Op. at 3. 
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Ten years later the Supreme Court reconsidered the 
scope of the Commerce Clause in Lopez. After reviewing the 
evolution of Commerce Clause jurisprudence the Court 
stated: 
 
       But even these modern-era precedents which have 
       expanded congressional power under the Commerce 
       Clause confirm that this power is subject to outer 
       limits. In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court warned 
       that the scope of the interstate commerce power must 
       be considered in the light of our dual system of 
       government and may not be expanded so as to 
       embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect 
       and remote that to embrace them, in view of our 
       complex society, would effectually obliterate the 
       distinction between what is national and what is local 
       and create a completely centralized government. . . . 
       Since that time, the Court has heeded that warning 
       and undertaken to decide whether a rational basis 
       existed for concluding that a regulated activity 
       sufficiently affected interstate commerce. 
 
514 U.S. at 556-57 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
 
The government quite correctly points out that Congress 
can regulate an intrastate activity "when the cumulative 
effect of a collection of such events might ultimately have 
substantial effect on interstate commerce." Appellee's Br. at 
23 (quoting United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 283 (3d 
Cir. 1996)). The government asserts that it need only show 
that the arson here had a de minimis effect because 
Congress can properly regulate the interstate activity of 
which it was a part. The district court agreed. See Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 2 ("I conclude that Lopez does not change the 
applicable standard for judging the sufficiency of the 
evidence. I therefore apply only a de minimis standard.") 
(citing Russell). 
 
The defendant, on the other hand, argues that when 
Congress imposes a regulation under its authority to 
"regulate those activities having a substantial relation to 
interstate commerce," the government can prosecute an 
activity pursuant to such regulation only if the activity has 
 
                                8 
  
a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce. Appellant's 
Br. at 20 & 24. 
 
We reversed the conviction in Gaydos, because the 
government had not satisfied the interstate commerce 
element of S 844(i). Although the defendant in Gaydos did 
not preserve her challenge to the sufficiency of the 
jurisdictional evidence, we reviewed the sufficiency of the 
evidence under a plain error standard, as a failure to prove 
an element of an offense is a fundamental error and may be 
noticed on appeal despite a defendant's failure to preserve 
the issue. Gaydos, 108 F.3d at 509. 
 
In Gaydos, the defendant tried to collect insurance 
proceeds by scheming to burn a residential building she 
owned. The building was abandoned and the owner had no 
intention of returning the property to the rental market. 
She had stated she had no intention of removing the lead 
paint that was in the building, and she had removed 
lighting and plumbing fixtures from it. As noted above, on 
appeal we first held that Lopez did not undermine the 
constitutionality of S 844(i). We then analyzed the broad 
pronouncements of Russell in context with the Supreme 
Court's subsequent amplification in Lopez as part of our 
plain error review of the sufficiency of the evidence. Our 
review focused upon cases involving arson of rental 
property. We concluded: 
 
       Collectively, this case law suggests that once the 
       business nature of the property at issue is established, 
       courts will presume, absent indicia of an intention to 
       permanently remove the property from the stream of 
       commerce, that the requisite nexus between the 
       property and interstate commerce is satisfied, 
       notwithstanding temporary changes or modifications in 
       the use of the property. We note that in each of these 
       cases, however, there was a clear intention that the 
       property at issue either remain in, or return to, the 
       stream of commerce. 
 
Id. at 509. We held that, inasmuch as Gaydos' property was 
uninhabitable, and she had no intention of ever 
rehabilitating it or renting it, the property did not have a 
sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to support a 
conviction under S 844(i). 
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       We conclude that a reasonable juror could not have 
       done more than speculate that the house . . . had a 
       real prospect of generating any future rental revenue. 
 
       . . . we hold that the government could not prove 
       beyond a reasonable doubt that the house . . . was 
       used in an activity affecting interstate commerce. 
 
Id. at 511. 
 
The inquiry in Gaydos centered upon whether the 
property was "used," as it was uninhabitable and certain to 
remain so.4 Here, much of the argument focuses upon the 
"interstate commerce" prong of S 844(i), as the Toyota was 
used "periodically" in Mrs. McGuire's catering business. 
Nevertheless, we consider both the nature and frequency of 
that use, as well as the extent to which the catering activity 
affected commerce, in deciding if the evidence supports the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction under Lopez. See Gaydos, 
108 F.3d at 508 (stating the need for a case-by-case inquiry 
where statute contains a jurisdictional element to"ensure 
. . . that the [activity] in question affects interstate 
commerce"). 
 
McGuire's argument that the government must show a 
"substantial" effect on interstate commerce to sustain a 
conviction under S 844(i) after Lopez draws support from 
United States v. Pappadouplouos, 64 F.3d 522, 527 (9th 
Cir. 1995). There, the defendant was convicted of 
conspiring to burn her home in violation of S 844(i) in an 
effort to collect over $4 million in insurance proceeds. The 
government argued that jurisdiction had been established 
by proof that the defendant's home received natural gas 
from out-of-state sources. The court of appeals reversed. 
The court held that Lopez precluded applyingS 844(i) to the 
arson of a private residence based only upon that property's 
receipt of natural gas from out-of-state. Id. at 527. 
 
The government counters McGuire's reliance upon 
Pappadouplouos by arguing that case is inapposite here 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. "Russell established that renting real estate is an activity that 
affects 
interstate commerce for purposes of S 844(i). Courts interpreting Russell 
have held that `rental property is per se property used in an activity 
affecting interstate commerce.' " Gaydos, 108 F.3d at 509. 
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because it dealt with the arson of a private residence. The 
nexus relied upon there (the home's connection to, and use 
of, an interstate supply of natural gas) did not satisfy 
S 844(i) because the property was not used in interstate 
commerce. Appellee's Br. at 21-22. 
 
The district court dismissed the holding in 
Pappadouplouos, based upon its conclusion that Lopez did 
not change the test adopted under earlier cases. 
Accordingly, the district court concluded that the 
prosecution need only show a de minimis effect on 
interstate commerce to support a conviction underS 844(i). 
See Dist. Ct. Op. at 2, 4 (citing the pre-Lopez cases of 
United States v. Stillwell, 900 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1990), 
and United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir. 
1985)). 
 
D. 
 
As we conduct our analysis we are mindful that,"in view 
of our complex society," there is virtually nothing that does 
not affect interstate commerce in some manner. Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 555. Though certain conduct may appear to be the 
quintessence of local activity, if we "follow the money" the 
trail we will always disclose some effect on interstate 
and/or foreign commerce. For example, though the effect is 
highly attenuated, driving a few blocks to pick up one's 
children (consumption of gasoline refined from foreign oil, 
and wear and tear on vehicle manufactured in another 
state or country) or eating dinner in front of one's own 
television set (consuming food and beverages from outside 
of state or country, as well as decisions on how to spend 
hundreds of millions of advertising dollars), have an 
indirect effect on interstate, and often foreign commerce. 
Even such a seemingly parochial action as borrowing a cup 
of sugar from a neighbor5 can be viewed as part of the 
stream of commerce that extends to refineries overseas. 
 
Thus, the district court's conclusion that a de minimis 
effect on interstate commerce (no matter how attenuated) 
can support the exercise of federal jurisdiction after Lopez, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Assuming there are communities where this still occurs. 
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could be stretched to include driving one's daughter to a 
neighbor's house to deliver a single box of Girl Scout 
cookies. In view of the Supreme Court's pronouncements in 
Lopez, we do not believe that such an inconsequential effect 
can support the exercise of federal jurisdiction over a 
purely intrastate concern without obliterating the 
distinctions between state and federal jurisdiction. 
 
The prosecution recognizes this. Though the government 
has argued throughout these proceedings that it need only 
show a de minimis effect on interstate commerce, it cites 
United States v. Denalli, 73 F.3d 328 (11th Cir. 1996) (per 
curiam), in conceding that "there are uses so trivial or 
attenuated that they are not covered by the statute." 
Appellee's Br. at 25. In Denalli, the defendant was convicted 
of burning the home of a neighbor named Federles, in 
violation of S 844(i). The government sought to establish 
jurisdiction by showing that Mr. Federles worked for a 
company that had various projects in Canada and was 
engaged in interstate and foreign commerce, and 
furthermore, Mr. Federles had a computer in his home on 
which he prepared memoranda for his employer on a 
weekly basis. The court, however, noted that Federles' 
employer did not require him to have a computer in his 
home, and the computer was not connected to a modem. 
Rather, Federles would print out his weekly memoranda 
and personally deliver them to his work place instead of 
transmitting them electronically. "He conducted no further 
activity for [his employer] at his residence that affected 
interstate commerce." Id. at 330. The court concluded that 
this was not sufficient to establish that Federles' home was 
used in an activity affecting commerce, and reversed the 
conviction.6 
 
The reasoning in Denalli was criticized in United States v. 
Hicks, 106 F. 3d 187 (7th Cir. 1997), wherein the court 
relied upon the aggregate effect of "local" conduct to uphold 
the exercise of jurisdiction. "[I]t doesn't take any fancy 
intellectual footwork to conclude that the aggregate effect of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Inasmuch as Federles was living in his home at the time it burned, we 
assume that it was connected to interstate utilities. See Pappadopoulos, 
supra. 
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such arsons on commerce is substantial." Id . at 189. The 
Hicks court disagreed with the holding in Denalli and 
Pappadopoulos, because it felt that those cases erroneously 
failed to consider the aggregate effect of the criminal 
conduct. The court in Hicks believed that the Commerce 
Clause clearly allowed the federal government to exercise 
authority over the interstate supply of natural gas, and a 
residential fire that interrupted that supply posed a 
sufficient federal concern to justify the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction. 
 
Hicks was in turn criticized in United States v. Corona, 
108 F.3d 565 (5th Cir. 1997). In Corona, the court stated, 
"we doubt that an effect as small as the cessation of 
natural gas service to a single household satisfies the 
constitutional requirement. Taking the `effects test' to its 
logical extreme would for all practical purposes grant the 
federal government a general police power, the very danger 
the Lopez Court warned us against." Id. at 570. 
 
We agree that the concerns expressed in Lopez preclude 
applying the "aggregation test" so broadly that it sweeps 
within its reach every use of every property that has an 
effect on interstate commerce no matter how diluted.7 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We do not, however, mean to suggest that a court can never consider 
the aggregate effect upon commerce. See United States. v. Gentile, 144 
F.3d 1365 (11th Cir. 1998) (court approved aggregating effect on 
interstate commerce where bomb was placed in a truck that was subject 
to an interstate leasing agreement, and was controlled by intended 
victim's employer); United States v. Chowdbury, 118 F.3d 742, 745 (11th 
Cir. 1997) (aggregating effects on business property"because business 
property will almost invariably be an element of a much broader 
commercial market"); United States v. Latouf, 132 F.3d 320, 326 (6th 
Cir. 1997) (in upholding conviction under S 844(i) for arson of a 
restaurant the court noted "[a]lthough these contacts standing alone 
may not have been sufficient to demonstrate the requisite `substantial' 
effect on interstate commerce, this court must consider these contacts in 
the aggregate") (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)). 
 
Although the courts that have been called upon to determine the 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction under S 844(i) after 
Lopez do not agree if the evidence must establish a substantial effect on 
commerce, we need not decide that issue here. We need only decide 
whether the record here supports the exercise of federal jurisdiction. 
Compare Latouf with Denalli. 
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government is correct in conceding that "some uses are so 
trivial or attenuated that they are not covered by[S 844(i)]." 
This prosecution is such a case. 
 
LD&B Catering was a "family business" consisting of Mrs. 
McGuire and her best friend Diane Murray. Mrs. McGuire 
asked Ms. Murray to become a partner because Mrs. 
McGuire's son was unwilling to get involved. App. at 55. 
The government offered evidence that Mrs. McGuire used 
her personal car (the Toyota Camry) in the catering 
business "only periodically." App. at 478. However, the jury 
was required to guess at how frequently the Toyota was 
used in connection with the catering business.8 Mrs. 
McGuire and Murray also used a van, Joseph McGuire's 
truck, and a truck belonging to Diane Murray's husband. 
App. at 479. It is not disputed that no business was lost 
because the Camry was partially destroyed. The manager of 
Tropicana's materials and systems testified that although 
the orange juice container here could be used 
commercially, it was consistent with residential use.9 App. 
at 586. We do not believe that a conviction for violating 18 
U.S.C. S 844(i) can be sustained on this record without 
obliterating the intrastate/interstate distinction that was 
reinforced under Lopez. 
 
Moreover, although Gaydos involved an inquiry under the 
"use" prong of S 844(i), we cannot ignore that the property 
there did, in the aggregate, affect interstate commerce. One 
need only look at the inventory of abandoned buildings that 
so deplete the tax base and real estate values of so many 
cities to appreciate that owning even an abandoned rental 
property could be interpreted as a use affecting interstate 
commerce, if we were to use the "aggregation test" to 
stretch interstate commerce to its furthest boundaries. Yet, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. This is not a situation where the Toyota was necessary to the catering 
operation. See United States v. Michaels, 726 F.2d 1307, 1310 (8th Cir. 
1984) (stating that sufficient evidence existed to satisfy the 
jurisdictional 
element of S 844(i) when the vehicle damaged was an integral and 
necessary part of the business). 
 
9. Pictures introduced at trial show that the orange juice container was 
the typical size that one might expect to see on the shelf of a 
supermarket or neighborhood convenience store. 
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we reversed the conviction in Gaydos because the evidence 
was not sufficient. Thus, our analysis here is consistent 
with the result we reached in Gaydos. 
 
We think that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. S 844(i) must 
rest upon more than the dubious interstate commerce 
nexus of our hypothetical cup of sugar, or the ephemeral 
nexus of the government's carton of orange juice."[I]n view 
of our complex society," supporting this conviction by so 
slender a thread as the government presented here would 
be tantamount to removing the jurisdictional requirement 
from S 844(i). We do not believe that the Supreme Court 
required Congress to include a jurisdictional element under 
Lopez only to have courts interpret the resulting statutes in 
such a way as to remove it. 
 
E. 
 
We realize that our decision fails to establish any bright 
line test that a trial court can apply in deciding if the 
jurisdictional evidence in a given case is sufficient to 
support a conviction under S 844(i). The Supreme Court 
recognizes that this "may in some cases result in legal 
uncertainty." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566. Yet, we cannot avoid 
all uncertainty if we are to allow for the "case-by-case 
inquiry" required under Lopez. See Gaydos, 108 F.3d at 
508 (citing Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1631-32). However, we 
believe that trial courts will be able to continue making 
practical, common sense determinations of whether the 
evidence in a given case is sufficient to justify the exercise 
of federal jurisdiction. " `[T]he question is necessarily one of 
degree' . . . . [T]here never will be a distinction between 
what is truly national and what is truly local, . . ." Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 567-68. 
 
Moreover, the "use" and effect upon interstate commerce 
here is so very nebulous that the evidence that was 
presented clearly cannot support the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction under this statute. We believe that the evidence 
here would have been insufficient to support this conviction 
even under a de minimis standard, if that standard were 
applied in a manner that is consistent with Lopez. Proof 
that this single bottle of orange juice was to have been used 
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10. In reaching our holding we do not mean to suggest that we are 
adopting the view of those courts that require the government to 
establish that a particular use has a "substantial" effect on interstate 
commerce under S 844(i). We only hold that the evidence presented here 
is not sufficient to support a conviction. 
by a business that is as concededly local in character as 
LD&B Catering is simply not sufficient to establish 
jurisdiction under S 844(i). 
 
III.  
 
For the reasons set forth above, we hold that the district 
court here erred in concluding that the government's 
evidence had the jurisdictional juice needed to support the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction under S 844(i). Accordingly, 
we will reverse the judgment of conviction and remand this 
matter to the district court for entry of an order consistent 
with this opinion.10 
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